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The Prefiguration of Some Aspects of the
Holocaust in the Armenian Genocide
(Revisiting the Comparative Perspective)
Vahakn N. Dadrian
Zoryan Institute
The field of genocide studies has been marked by a comparative tendency, while at
the same time scholarship on the Holocaust has tended to focus on its singularity;
the Armenian Genocide has often been treated as representing a ‘‘dress rehearsal’’
for the Holocaust. This article examines the parallels and commonalities, as well as
the differences, between the two events, with a view to drawing them into a
comparative perspective. More specifically, four major factors (vulnerability of the
victim group, degradation of victims, war as opportunity, and fear of retaliation on
the part of perpetrators) and three subsidiary factors (methods of extermination,
disregard of economic factors, and terminological deflection) are examined with
respect to both the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide.
Keywords: Holocaust, Armenian Genocide, comparative perspective
From its very inception, genocide studies has been marked by a tendency to be infused
with some elements of comparativeness, while the case of the Holocaust has benefited
from a profusion of works focusing on and detailing elements of singularity. The World
War I Armenian Genocide has served, in this respect, a useful purpose, especially
because of its significant similarities to and certain commonalities with the Holocaust.
This element of a nexus, a connecting link, was not only recognized but harnessed by
Raphael Lemkin for a wide and encompassing project that ushered in the era of
genocide studies. In ‘‘Totally Unofficial Man,’’ Lemkin wrote,
In 1915 . . . I began . . . to read more history to study whether national, religious, or racial
groups as such were being destroyed. The truth came out after the war. In Turkey, more
than 1,200,000 Armenians were put to death . . . After the end of the war, some 150
Turkish war criminals were arrested and interned by the British Government on the
island of Malta . . . Then one day, I read in the newspapers that all Turkish war
criminals were to be released. I was shocked. A nation that killed and the guilty persons
were set free . . . I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be
adopted by the world.1

The seminal nature of the perspective inherent in this statement is noteworthy.
Lemkin is not only recognizing the reality of centrally organized mass murder but also
discerning the pressing need for legal mechanisms to control such a crime, with the
ultimate objective of preventing it. Unlike many earlier authors, however, Lemkin set
out to pave the way for framing and eventually establishing internationally prevalent
penal codes for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Central to all
this legal and criminological endeavor was the quest for a solution to the ubiquitous
problem of impunity attending that crime.2 The threat of punishment, to the extent
that it could be made credible, was meant to serve the purpose of prevention.
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One of the foremost leaders of Zionism in Germany, Richard Lichtheim, who
represented that movement in the Ottoman capital during World War I, went further
when he focused on the matter of precedence. Lichtheim wrote that the Armenian
experience was ‘‘the first instance of a systematic persecution in modern history,
resembling Hitler’s . . . crusade of destruction against the Jews.’’3 Two other experts
appear to have concurred: Joseph Guttman characterized the Armenian case as
‘‘the beginnings of genocide,’’4 while Jehuda L. Wallach, a military historian from Tel
Aviv, discerned ‘‘a certain parallel between the Jewish and Armenian catastrophes.’’5
These linkages found a legal echo in the declaration of a jurist who played a major
role in the criminal prosecution of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg. Robert Kempner
was chief of division, responsible for preparing the cases of these leaders; he was
also assistant to Justice Robert Jackson, chief counsel for the United States. In a
law-journal article dealing with the Armenian Genocide, Kempner declared that
‘‘for the first time in legal history,’’ the principle of ‘‘human rights violations, especially
genocide,’’ was recognized. He further declared that such recognition was acted
upon ‘‘without committing unauthorized intervention in the internal affairs of another
country.’’6
In the more recent past, several noted experts on the Holocaust have expressed
themselves along identical lines or in similar ways. Richard Rubenstein, for example,
discerns ‘‘an eerie parallel’’ between the two cases.7 Stating that the Armenian
Genocide ‘‘foreshadows the Holocaust,’’ Yehuda Bauer uses the same term, ‘‘parallel.’’8
In a subsequent essay he again cites the Armenian case as offering ‘‘the closest parallel
to the Jewish Holocaust . . . On this continuum of murderous behaviour, the Armenian
massacres would figure nearest to the Holocaust.’’ However, Bauer seems to have felt
the need to interject a caveat: ‘‘The Turks never planned the murder of Armenians
outside Turkey . . . [whereas the Jews became victims of] a plan for the total physical
annihilation of a people, everywhere one finds them.’’9 Sharing Bauer’s view of the
‘‘uniqueness’’ of the Holocaust, Lucy Davidowicz also grants the parallels, as evident in
the Turkish massacres of Armenians, which in their extent and horror most closely
approximated the murder of European Jews . . . The once unthinkable ‘‘Armenian
solution’’ became, in our time, the achievable ‘‘Final Solution,’’ the Nazi code name for
the annihilation of European Jews.10

In his classic treatise on the subject, Leo Kuper, another pioneer, after describing it as
the ‘‘forgotten genocide,’’ saw it fit to characterize the Armenian Genocide as ‘‘the
precursor of the coldly calculated bureaucratic genocide’’11—that is, the Holocaust.
For his part, Israel Charny describes the Armenian instance as ‘‘a dress rehearsal for
the Holocaust.’’12 Yisrael Ring, another Israeli historian, is quoted as saying that the
Armenian Genocide, ‘‘a model for recent history,’’ in fact proved to be a ‘‘purifying
precedent’’ for the Holocaust.13
Reference may also be made to Helen Fein, who occupies a prominent place in the
galaxy of pioneers in genocide studies. Fein’s basic premise, shared by many others cited
above, is that unless single case studies progress to the level of comparative studies, the
field of genocide studies will essentially be handicapped as a scientific discipline. This
standpoint is enunciated in her magnum opus, Accounting for Genocide, through the
postulate that ‘‘for over a millennium preceding their annihilation, both Jews and
Armenians had been decreed by the dominant group that was to perpetrate the crime to
be outside the sanctified universe of obligation.’’14 As a matter of fact, the concept of the
‘‘sanctified universe of obligation’’ has become the very essence of Fein’s overall
conceptual framework in the general theory of genocide.
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The present essay is an attempt at further developing the common body of
knowledge in genocide studies by exploring in more detail the comparative aspects of
these two genocides. Such an attempt neither negates the very important factors that
separate the two nor discounts the signal fact that the Holocaust is simply the bestknown case in the overall picture of genocide studies. As a point of departure, however,
one may revert back to Fein’s perspective. In her introductory chapter Fein repeatedly
singles out some of the specifics of this phenomenon, which may be summed up as
follows. Both victim groups (i.e., the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the Jews in
Europe) lacked ‘‘sovereignty’’ and a ‘‘parent state’’; hence, both were highly ‘‘vulnerable’’
victim groups, notwithstanding their ‘‘international affiliations,’’ which did not compare
with the protective condition afforded by a nation-state. This vulnerability was
ensconced in the belittling titles—‘‘rayah’’ and ‘‘alien’’—that were attached to both
victim groups. Similarly, both victim groups had experienced, at various levels and
under different conditions, episodic ‘‘pogroms’’ during the nineteenth century—even
though Jews were more assimilated, in terms of their involvement in political parties.
Armenians stood among their neighbors very much as the Jews of Poland and Russia
did; the former suffered the indignities of exclusion from the ‘‘Islamic universe,’’ the
latter of exclusion from the ‘‘Christian universe.’’ Both victim groups became targets of a
‘‘premeditated genocide’’ that was coterminous with ‘‘organized state murder’’ involving
‘‘rational function’’ (i.e., ‘‘choice by the perpetrator’’). Both perpetrator groups, the Nazis
and the Young Turks, also ‘‘test[ed] the ground’’ by recourse to pre-genocidal
‘‘oppression’’ and ‘‘calculated violence against the victims.’’15
By departing from this overview of insights and observations, which appear to be
conditioned by the authors’ inveterate connectedness to Jewish ethnicity, the nexus to
a transposed image of victimhood, it may be possible to construct a comparative
perspective. In this respect, four primary factors may be designated for the further
exploration of the comparative perspective: vulnerability, degradation of the victims,
war as opportunity, and fear of retaliation. On a secondary level, the following
subsidiary factors may be singled out for brief comment: techniques of extermination,
belittling the economic factor, and terminological cover-ups and deflection.

1. Vulnerability
Declaring Jews ‘‘a security risk,’’ the Nazi Foreign Ministry urged ‘‘the deportation’’ of
all Jews residing ‘‘in Axis countries.’’ This vulnerability, in the main, issued from the
fact that the Jews were ‘‘all alone’’ and had ‘‘no parent state,’’ while the ‘‘Allies
refrained from intervening.’’16 General Wladyslaw Sikorski, president of the
Conference on War Crimes held at St. James’s Palace in 1942, justified the Allies’
refusal to publicly acknowledge Nazi crimes against the Jews in their declaration on
war crimes in January of that year by arguing that ‘‘the Jews were considered
nationals of their reflective states’’ rather than being a distinct national group.17
In the Armenian case, we can observe a similar pattern of exploiting the
vulnerability of the Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire. Notorious in this
respect is the promulgation, on 19 May/1 June 1915, of the Deportation Law, which
was first proposed to the cabinet by Interior Minister Talât on 13/26 May 1915 and
approved first by Grand Vizier Said Halim on 14/27 May and subsequently, and rather
deviously, by the cabinet on 17/30 May (the established procedure required cabinet
approval first). Article 2 of that law rendered the entire Armenian population, rather
indirectly, a target of the whims of military authorities at almost all levels, who were
thus given license to order deportations at the slightest hint (hissetmek) that the
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victims might be suspected of ‘‘espionage and treason.’’18 The vulnerability here stems
from the deliberate vagueness, imprecision, and general arbitrariness of the
legislation. Talât recognized this element of license when he explicitly exhorted the
Armenian parliamentary deputy Vartkes, just before the latter’s arrest and
subsequent murder—despite his parliamentary immunity—that he intended to take
full advantage of the opportunity offered by the war to settle scores and resolve the
Armenian question.19 When Henry Morgenthau, then US ambassador to Turkey, tried
to intercede on behalf of the Armenians, Talât reportedly brushed him off, saying that
‘‘the fate of the Armenians’’ should be of ‘‘no concern of the U.S.A.’’20 A brief
examination of the comparative aspects of this vulnerability factor affecting the fates
of both victim groups is available within the framework of a legal analysis.21

2. Degradation of the Victims
Going back to the era of the anti-Semitic protestant leader Martin Luther, the Nazis,
faithfully emulating him, proceeded to denounce the Jew as ‘‘a criminal, a thug, a beast
of prey.’’ Hitler himself referred to ‘‘a battle against a satanical power,’’ while another
top Nazi, Julius Streicher, depicted the Jews as parasites ‘‘who live by the sweat of
others.’’ Heinrich Himmler, chief of the SS and the police; Hans Frank, the overall
governor of Poland; and Otto Thierack, the Nazis’ minister of justice, were inclined to
the view that the Jews ‘‘were a lower species of life which upon contact infected the
German people with deadly disease.’’22 Himmler, for his part, stated that ‘‘just because
we exterminated a bacterium, we do not want, in the end, to be infected by that
bacterium and die of it,’’ while Frank often described the Jews as ‘‘lice.’’23 In April
1943, during a visit to Berlin by Admiral Miklos Horthy, regent of Hungary, Hitler
again denounced the Jews as ‘‘tubercular bacilli.’’24
Although there is a relative paucity of similar denigrations of the Armenians
within the Turkish camp, one of the most ferocious of the Turkish ge´nocidaires,
Dr. Mehmed Res" id—a veterinarian by training, and the governor general of Diyarbekir
province—described his Armenian victims as ‘‘microbes,’’ posing the rhetorical
question, ‘‘Isn’t the duty of a doctor to destroy these microbes?’’25

3. War as Opportunity
It is no accident that the two of the twentieth century’s many genocides were
consummated, with remarkable efficiency, during the two world wars (specifically,
between 1942 and 1945 and in 1915–1916). Indeed, on 13 December 1942, Joseph
Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, declared, ‘‘At bottom . . . I believe both the
English and the Americans are happy that we are exterminating the Jewish riffraff.’’26 Himmler and Goebbels considered the war a ‘‘unique opportunity for ‘Solving
the problem.’ ’’27 While completing the preparations for the Auschwitz concentration
camp, Himmler told Rudolf Höss, commandant of the camp, that Hitler’s order for the
‘‘Final Solution’’ would have to be carried out because otherwise ‘‘the Jews will later
destroy the German people.’’28
Official German documents amply confirm the same wartime opportunism with
respect to the Armenian genocide. On 27 July 1915, for example, Germany’s consul in
Aleppo, Walter Rössler, reported to his chancellor in Berlin that the Turkish
authorities were exploiting the war and their alliance with Germany to solve ‘‘the
Armenian Question.’’29 On 10 August 1915, Erzurum’s vice-consul, Max Erwin
Scheubner-Richter, likewise informed the chancellor that the ‘‘Armenian question’’
that for decades had been occupying European diplomacy ‘‘will be solved now, during
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the war.’’30 The German Colonel Stange, on duty in the area of the genocidal
operations, reported to his superior, Marshal Otto Liman von Sanders, that the Turks
were bent on exploiting ‘‘this favorable opportunity’’ (diese günstige Gelegenheit) for
solving the Armenian question.31 The wartime German ambassador, Count Paul von
Wolff-Metternich, reported that the Turks were hiding behind the argument of
‘‘wartime exigency’’ to justify their atrocities (verschanzen sich hinter
Kriegsnotwendigkeiten).32 In a second report, Scheubner-Richter told Berlin that the
Young Turk leaders (otherwise identified as leaders of the Committee for Union and
Progress, or CUP) had confided to him, as a representative of an allied power, that the
wartime deportations of the Armenians were only a vehicle for the latter’s ultimate
eradication.33 The foremost urgency of completing the task of eradicating the
Armenians during the war was given expression in a memorandum jointly signed by
Talât and Enver on 2 August 1916. Forwarded to Berlin by Marine Attaché and Lt.
Commander Hans Humann, this memo contained Talât’s revealing exhortation to
Berlin that he must bring to completion his plan of liquidating the Armenians: ‘‘The
work that is to be done must be done now.’’34

4. Fear of Retaliation
Raul Hilberg maintains that the overall public rationale for the genocidal campaign
against the Jews was the so-called Jewish danger. Even the Nazis’ mobile killing units
(Einsatzgruppen) had to contrive such rationales, although they had no need to
account to anyone for their crimes—not even Reinhardt Heydrich, chief of the Reich
Security Head Office.35 Himmler, in the course of an address to the general lieutenants
(Gruppenführer) of the SS delivered in 1943, declared, ‘‘We had the moral right vis-àvis our people to annihilate (umzubringen) this people which wanted to annihilate
us.’’36 On 5 February 1943, in the wake of the shattering defeat at Stalingrad, the
German press was instructed to emphasize that ‘‘if we lose the war, we do not fall into
the hands of some other states but will all be annihilated by world Jewry. Jewry firmly
decided (fest entschlossen) to exterminate all Germans. International law and
international custom will be no protection against the Jewish will for total
annihilation. (totaler Vernichtungswille der Juden).37
Ismail Enver, war minister and de facto commander-in-chief of the OttomanTurkish Army during World War I, told Morgenthau that he had ‘‘greatest admiration
for the intelligence and industry’’ of the Armenians; but, he added, ‘‘a few hundred
bright Armenians [are capable of] overturning Turkish government.’’38 For his part,
Talât, omnipotent CUP party boss and interior minister, told the American
ambassador that ‘‘no Armenian can be our friend after what we have done to
them.’’39 Lewis Einstein, special agent at the American embassy in Constantinople
(now Istanbul), reported that in a recent exchange Enver had admitted the CUP’s
apprehensions, saying that the CUP ‘‘fears the Armenians.’’40

Additional Subsidiary Factors
1. Techniques and Methods of Extermination
Although the gas chambers were the principal vehicle of Nazi mass murder, other
methods served as auxiliary means; these, however, should be viewed as infrequent
and, therefore, as incidental rather than regular techniques. One of these was the act
of burning alive (i.e., the en masse incineration of victims). In Slonim, for example,
‘‘many houses were set afire, until the entire ghetto was a mass of flames . . . Additional
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raiders then arrived with gasoline cans and burned the dead and wounded in the
streets.’’41 Moreover, following the establishment of the anti-partisan command under
Erich von dem Bach Zelewski, ‘‘[the perpetrators] were thrown into the action on
November 26, 1942 . . . 1828 Jews not counting bandits, Jews, etc., were burned in
houses or dugouts.’’42 Commenting on von dem Bach’s role, a psychologist described
him as a man
whose record of looting, arson and mass murder is equaled only by the Huns and
Mongols of days past. General von dem Bach was the deputy Genghis khan of this
horde. The troops which he commanded included the notorious Dirlewanger Brigade
which was composed of habitual criminals . . . one single report . . . shows that, among
others, 363,211 Jews were executed by these formations.43

However, Hilberg mentions an incident that depicts von dem Bach as a man weary of
the psychological damage his troops were suffering as a result of these barbarities.
He reportedly told Himmler,
Look at the eyes of the men in this Kommando, how deeply shaken they are! These men
are finished [fertig] for the rest of their lives. What kind of followers are we training
here? Either neurotics or savages!44

Such acts of immolation, however, as stated above, were quite widespread in the
Armenian case; as such, they were a more or less integral part of the Armenian
Genocide. Among numerous accounts available for study is the vivid eyewitness
testimony of a Jewish observer, Eitan Belkind, an officer in the wartime Turkish army
with duties at the headquarters of the Ottoman Fourth Army:
After a three day ride I reached the heart of Mesopotamia where I was a witness to a
terrible tragedy . . . The Circassian soldiers ordered the Armenians to gather thorns and
thistles and to pile them into a tall pyramid . . . afterwards they tied all the Armenians
who were there, almost five thousand souls, hand to hand, encircled them like a ring
around the pile of thistles and set it afire in a blaze which rose up to heaven together
with the screams of the wretched people who were burned to death by the fire . . . Two
days later I returned to this place and saw the charred bodies of thousands of human
beings.45

Colonel Ludwig Schraudenbach, German commander of the Ottoman-Turkish
Fourteenth Division, operating likewise in Mesopotamia, cites in his memoirs another
case of burning alive. Relaying information he had received, he writes that ‘‘children
were placed between wooden planks, tied to them, and then burned to death.’’46
The Swedish missionary Alma Johansson, on duty in wartime Turkey, reported that
the Armenian inmates of an orphanage in Mus" , along with the staff, were burned alive
(‘‘lebendig verbrannt’’).47 For his part, the German physician H. Stoffels, likewise on
duty in wartime Turkey, reported that on his way to the same city of Mush he saw ‘‘a
large number of formerly Armenian localities, where in the churches and houses were
charred and decomposed corpses of women and children’’ (verkohlte und verweste
Frauen und Kinderleichen).48 Rafael Nogales, a Venezuelan major who had
volunteered his services to the Turkish Army during World War I and held the title
Inspector General reported observing, in the same area, ‘‘women and children penned
up and burned alive.’’49
Even more striking in this connection are authentic Turkish testimonies.
Foremost among them is that of General Mehmed Vehip, commander of the Turkish
Third Army, who testified before the Turkish military tribunal that prosecuted the
authors of the Armenian Genocide in the aftermath of World War I. Vehip reported that
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‘‘Armenian women and children were burnt alive in the village of Churig, located five
kilometers north of Mush’’; during an inspection of the area, he had seen the charred
remains of the victims.50 Reference may also be made to the testimony of a Turkish
military officer who, likewise, had personally observed the evidence of the holocaust in
and around Mus" and who ventured to identify Küçük Kâzim, the Turkish military officer
who ‘‘was burning down the entire Mush valley and was annihilating the Armenians.’’51

2. Discounting the Economic Factor
According to Hilberg, ‘‘the destruction process was oriented not to cost but to
efficiency.’’52 In the Nazi case, the authorities of the Ministry for Eastern Occupied
Territories insisted that ‘‘economic questions should not be considered in the solution
of the Jewish question.’’53 A similar frame of mind can be discerned in the attitudes of
the CUP leaders involved in genocidal decision making in Turkey. During an exchange
with Morgenthau, for example, Talât declared, ‘‘We care nothing about the commercial
loss. We have figured all that out . . . We don’t worry about that.’’54 Enver declared to
the same ambassador, ‘‘Economic considerations are of no importance at this time’’; the
two were discussing the huge fiscal losses the Turkish economy was incurring as a
result of the elimination of the Armenians.55 These considerations are confirmed by
the memoirs of Halidé Edib, a nationalist and feminist Turkish writer whom Talât,
particularly, held in high esteem. Edib relates some exchanges with Talât and
acknowledges that, in fact, self-serving economic considerations played a paramount
role in the decision to uproot the Armenians: the goal was ‘‘to end the economic
supremacy of the Armenians thereby clearing the markets for the Turks and the
Germans.’’56

3. Terminological Deflections and Cover-Ups
The Nazis contrived an extensive vocabulary for the express purpose of camouflaging
their real goal with respect to the Jews; Hilberg’s list takes up most of a page.57
The most recurrent terms are Ausschaltung (‘‘elimination’’), Aussiedlung (‘‘resettlement’’), Sondermassnahmen (‘‘special measures’’), Sonderaktionen (‘‘special
actions’’), and Sonderbehandlung (‘‘special treatment’’). The Jews were ‘‘bluffed’’ and
tricked with ‘‘registrations’’ and ‘‘resettlements,’’ with ‘‘baths’’ and ‘‘inhalations.’’58 In
the Armenian case, however, the decision makers throughout confined themselves to
the twin terms tehcir (‘‘deportation’’) and tebdili mekân (‘‘relocation’’), deflecting
attention from the covert purposes of the mechanisms of deportation and covering up
the ultimate, exterminatory goal.59

Conclusion
Superseding in import and consequence all these similarities and commonalities is the
overarching illegality of the origins and evolving careers of the regimes of both
perpetrator groups—the type of illegality that, completely devoid of elements of
responsibility and accountability, readily degenerated into lethal criminality. In the
process, the functions of each state were overwhelmed by the imposition on their
respective systems of the desiderata of two highly monolithic and dictatorial political
parties. The subversion and ultimate criminalization of these state functions thus
became the order of the day. The Reichstag fire and the Enabling Act (in February and
March 1933) and the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, on the one hand, or the January 1913
Young Turk overthrow of the government and the subsequent political purges
throughout the land, on the other, are the incipient initiatives of this process. The
prevalence of the common pattern of substituting party authority (that of NSDAP and
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the CUP, with all their variants) for legitimate state authority is all too evident.
Accordingly, the cardinal lesson to be derived from this comparative essay is that the
arch determinant in cases of genocide is not the state, to whose powers and resources are
generally attributed the latitude for genocidal decision making and the associated
enactment, but the progressively incremental power structure of dictatorial political
parties. Equally important is the fact of the illicit capture of constitutional authority and
its transfer from the legitimate state to a political party that is mobilized with highly
secretive and radical designs, some of them exterminatory; such illicit action is capable
of providing the requisite dynamics for genocidal radicalism. Among the many ways in
which state functions are thus subverted, perhaps the most consequential is that many
of these functions are reduced and instrumentalized for the hidden goals of the party. In
other words, in addition to subverting its functions, the quasi-omnipotent party
specifically aims to reduce the state to a level of optimal subservience to the party.
This has been confirmed by wartime Turkish general Vehip. In one way or another,
consequently, the state ultimately becomes complicit in the series of crimes that
inevitably ensues. This is a process that might be called outcome-oriented, radical, and
deadly task performance. Such an outcome was foreseen by Aristotle when he declared,
nearly twenty-five centuries ago, that ‘‘when separated from law and justice man is the
worst of all animals.’’60
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